What Is Advanced Internal Rating-Based (AIRB)?

An advanced internal rating-based (AIRB) approach to credit risk measurement is a method that requests that all risk components be calculated internally within a financial institution. Advanced internal rating-based (AIRB) can help an institution reduce its capital requirements and credit risk.

In addition to the basic internal rating-based (IRB) approach estimations, the advanced approach assesses the risk of default using loss given default (LGD), exposure at default (EAD), and the probability of default (PD). These three elements help determine the risk-weighted asset (RWA) that is calculated on a percentage basis for the total required capital.”

Understanding Advanced Internal Rating-Based Systems

Implementing the AIRB approach is one step in the process of becoming a Basel II-compliant institution. However, an institution may implement the AIRB approach only if they comply with certain supervisory standards outlined in the Basel II accord.

Basel II is a set of international banking regulations, issued by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision in July 2006, which expand upon those outlined in Basel I. These regulations provided uniform rules and guidelines to level the international banking field. Basel II expanded the rules for minimum capital requirements established under Basel I, provided a framework for regulatory review, and set disclosure requirements for assessment of capital adequacy. Basel II also incorporates credit risk of institutional assets.

Advanced Internal Rating-Based Systems and Empirical Models

The AIRB approach allows banks to estimate many internal risk components themselves. While the empirical models among institutions vary, one example is the Jarrow-Turnbull model. Originally developed and published by Robert A. Jarrow (Kamakura Corporation and Cornell University), along with Stuart Turnbull, (University of Houston), the Jarrow-Turnbull model is a “reduced-form” credit model. Reduced form credit models center on describing bankruptcy as a statistical process, in contrast with a microeconomic model of the firm’s capital structure. (The latter process forms the basis of common “structural credit models.”) The Jarrow–Turnbull model employs a random interest rates framework. Financial institutions often work with both structural credit models and Jarrow-Turnbull ones, when determining the risk of default.

Advanced Internal Rating-Based systems also help banks determine loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD). Loss given default is the amount of money to be lost in the event of a borrower default; while exposure at default (EAD) is the total value a bank is exposed to at the time of said default.

Advanced Internal Rating-Based Systems and Capital Requirements

Set by regulatory agencies, such as the Bank for International Settlements, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve Board, capital requirements set the amount of liquidity is needed to be held for a certain level of assets at many financial institutions. They also ensure that banks and depository institutions have enough capital to both sustain operating losses and honor withdrawals. AIRB can help financial institutions determine these levels.

What Is Agency Theory?

Agency theory is a principle that is used to explain and resolve issues in the relationship between business principals and their agents. Most commonly, that relationship is the one between shareholders, as principals, and company executives, as agents.

Understanding Agency Theory

An agency, in broad terms, is any relationship between two parties in which one, the agent, represents the other, the principal, in day-to-day transactions. The principal or principals have hired the agent to perform a service on their behalf.

Principals delegate decision-making authority to agents. Because many decisions that affect the principal financially are made by the agent, differences of opinion, and even differences in priorities and interests, can arise. Agency theory assumes that the interests of a principal and an agent are not always in alignment. This is sometimes referred to as the principal-agent problem.

By definition, an agent is using the resources of a principal. The principal has entrusted money but has little or no day-to-day input. The agent is the decision-maker but is incurring little or no risk because any losses will be borne by the principal.

Financial planners and portfolio managers are agents on behalf of their principals and are given responsibility for the principals’ assets. A lessee may be in charge of protecting and safeguarding assets that do not belong to them. Even though the lessee is tasked with the job of taking care of the assets, the lessee has less interest in protecting the goods than the actual owners.

Areas of Dispute in Agency Theory

Agency theory addresses disputes that arise primarily in two key areas: A difference in goals or a difference in risk aversion.

For example, company executives, with an eye toward short-term profitability and elevated compensation, may desire to expand a business into new, high-risk markets. However, this could pose an unjustified risk to shareholders, who are most concerned with the long-term growth of earnings and share price appreciation.

Another central issue often addressed by agency theory involves incompatible levels of risk tolerance between a principal and an agent. For example, shareholders in a bank may object that management has set the bar too low on loan approvals, thus taking on too great a risk of defaults.

Reducing Agency Loss

Various proponents of agency theory have proposed ways to resolve disputes between agents and principals. This is termed “reducing agency loss.” Agency loss is the amount that the principal contends was lost due to the agent acting contrary to the principal’s interests.

Chief among these strategies is the offering of incentives to corporate managers to maximize the profits of their principals. The stock options awarded to company executives have their origin in agency theory. These incentives seek a way to optimize the relationship between principals and agents. Other practices include tying executive compensation in part to shareholder returns. These are examples of how agency theory is used in corporate governance.

These practices have led to concerns that management will endanger long-term company growth in order to boost short-term profits and their own pay. This can often be seen in budget planning, where management reduces estimates in annual budgets so that they are guaranteed to meet performance goals. These concerns have led to yet another compensation scheme in which executive pay is partially deferred and to be determined according to long-term goals.

These solutions have their parallels in other agency relationships. Performance-based compensation is one example. Another is requiring that a bond is posted to guarantee delivery of the desired result. And then there is the last resort, which is simply firing the agent.