What Is the Additional Child Tax Credit?

The additional child tax credit was the refundable portion of the child tax credit. It could be claimed by families who owed the IRS less than their qualified child tax credit amount. Since the child tax credit was non-refundable, the additional child tax credit refunded the unused portion of the child tax credit to the taxpayer. This provision was eliminated from 2018 to 2025 by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA).

However, under the TCJA, the child tax credit includes some provisions for refundable credits. In addition, on March 11, 2021, President Biden’s American Rescue Plan was voted into law and made child tax credits fully refundable in 2021.

Understanding the Additional Child Tax Credit

A tax credit is a benefit given to eligible taxpayers to help reduce their tax liabilities. If Susan’s tax bill is $5,550 but she qualifies for a $2,500 tax credit, she will only have to pay $3,050. Some tax credits are refundable, meaning that if the tax credit amounts to more than what is owed as tax, the individual will receive a refund. If Susan’s tax credit is actually $6,050 and is refundable, she will be given a check for $6,050 – $5,550 = $500.

Depending on what tax group a taxpayer falls in, they may be eligible to claim a tax credit. For example, taxpayers with children may qualify for the child tax credit which helps to offset the costs of raising kids.

For the 2022 through 2025 tax year, the child tax credit allows eligible tax filers to reduce their tax liability by up to $2,000 per child. To be eligible for the child tax credit, the child or dependent must:

• Be 16 years or younger by the end of the tax year
• Be a U.S. citizen, national, or resident alien
• Have lived with the taxpayer for more than half of the tax year
• Be claimed as a dependent on the federal tax return
• Not have provided more than half of their own financial support
• Have a Social Security number

Child Tax Credit vs. Additional Child Tax Credit

Previously, the child tax credit was non-refundable, which means the credit could reduce a taxpayer’s bill to zero, but any excess from the credit would not be refunded. Families who wanted to keep the unused portion of the child tax credit could go the route of another available tax credit called the additional child tax credit.

This credit was a refundable tax credit that families could qualify for if they already qualified for the non-refundable child tax credit. The additional child tax credit was ideal for families who owed less than the child tax credit and wanted to receive a refund for the surplus credit.

While the additional child tax credit was eliminated in 2018 under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), up to $1,400 of the $2,000 child tax credit can be refundable for each qualifying child if certain conditions are met. For example, a taxpayer needs to earn more than $2,500 for the tax year to qualify for any refund. To claim a refund, filers must complete Schedule 8812.

The American Rescue Plan created major changes to the child tax credit for 2021. The maximum credit rose to $3,000 (children up to 17) or $3,600 (children younger than six). Qualifying families started receiving monthly checks (half of the full credit) in July 2021. The credit also became fully refundable in 2021, and families may claim the second half of the credit on their 2021 tax return. This child-related tax benefit begins to phase out for individual filers with children who earn more than $75,000 and joint filers earning more than $150,000.

Example of the Additional Child Tax Credit

Before the TCJA, the IRS allowed families with an annual income of more than $3,000 to claim a refund using the additional child tax credit. The tax credit depended on how much the taxpayer earned and was calculated by taking 15% of the taxpayer’s taxable earned income over $3,000 up to the maximum amount of the credit, which was then $1,000 per child. The total amount above $3,000 (subject to annual adjustments for inflation) was refundable.

For example, a taxpayer with two dependents qualifies for the child tax credit. Their earned income is $28,000, which means income over $3,000 is $25,000. Since 15% x $25,000 = $3,750 is greater than the maximum credit of $2,000 for two kids, they would have received the full portion of any unused credit.

So if the taxpayer received an $800 child tax credit, they would be refunded a $1,200 Additional child tax credit. However, if the taxable earned income was $12,000 instead, 15% of this amount over $3,000 is 15% x $9,000 = $1,350. Because the refundable portion of the credit cannot exceed 15% of earned income above $3,000, the taxpayer would receive a maximum refund of $1,350, not $2,000.

Taxpayers who were residents of Puerto Rico with income below $3,000 were eligible if they had at least three qualifying dependents and paid Social Security tax in excess of the amount of their earned-income credit for the year.

What Was the Asian Financial Crisis?

The Asian financial crisis, also called the “Asian Contagion,” was a sequence of currency devaluations and other events that began in July 1997 and spread across Asia. The crisis started in Thailand when the government ended the local currency’s de facto peg to the U.S. dollar after depleting much of the country’s foreign exchange reserves trying to defend it against months of speculative pressure.

Just weeks after Thailand stopped defending its currency, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia were also compelled to let their currencies fall as speculative market pressure built. By October, the crisis spread to South Korea, where a balance-of-payments crisis brought the government to the brink of default.

Other economies also came under pressure, but those with solid economic fundamentals and hefty foreign exchange reserves fared much better. Hong Kong fended off several major but unsuccessful speculative attacks on its currency, which is pegged to the U.S. dollar via a currency board system and backed by massive U.S. dollar reserves. 

Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis

As the Thai baht fell, other Asian currencies fell—some precipitously. Across Asia, inflows of capital slowed or reversed.

The Thai baht had been trading at about 26 to the U.S. dollar before the crisis but lost half its value by the end of 1997, falling to 53 to the dollar by January 1998. The South Korean won fell from about 900 to the dollar to 1,695 by the end of 1997. The Indonesian rupiah, which had been trading at around 2,400 to the dollar in June 1997, plummeted to 14,900 by June 1998, less than one-sixth its precrisis level.

Some of the more heavily affected countries fell into severe recession. Indonesia’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth fell from 4.7% in 1997 to -13.1% in 1998. In the Philippines, it slid from 5.2% to -0.5% over the same period. Malaysia’s GDP growth similarly slid from 7.3% in 1997 to -7.4% in 1998, while South Korea’s contracted from 6.2% to -5.1%.

In Indonesia, the ensuing economic crisis led to the collapse of the three-decade-old dictatorship of President Suharto.

The crisis was alleviated by intervention from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank, among others, which poured some $118 billion into Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea to bail out their economies.

As a result of the the crisis, affected countries restructured their economies, generally because the IMF required reform as a condition of help. The specific policy changes were different in each country but generally involved strengthening weak financial systems, lowering debt levels, raising interest rates to stabilize currencies, and cutting government spending.

The crisis also serves as a valuable case study for economists to understand how interwoven markets affect one another, especially as it relates to currency trading and national accounts management.

Causes of the Asian Financial Crisis

The crisis was rooted in several threads of industrial, financial, and monetary government policies and the investment trends that they created. Once the crisis began, markets reacted strongly, and one currency after another came under pressure. Some of the macroeconomic problems included current account deficits, high levels of foreign debt, climbing budget deficits, excessive bank lending, poor debt-service ratios, and imbalanced capital inflows and outflows.

Many of these problems were the result of policies to promote export-led economic growth in the years leading up to the crisis. Governments worked closely with manufacturers to support exports, including providing subsidies to favored businesses, more favorable financing, and a currency peg to the U.S. dollar to ensure an exchange rate favorable to exporters.

While this did support exports, it also created risk. Explicit and implicit government guarantees to bail out domestic industries and banks meant investors often did not assess the profitability of an investment but instead looked to its political support. Investment policies also created cozy relationships among local conglomerates, financial institutions, and the regulators who oversaw their industries. Large volumes of foreign money flowed in, often with little attention to potential risks. These factors all contributed to a massive moral hazard in Asian economies, encouraging major investment in marginal and potentially unsound projects.

As the crisis spread, it became clear that the impressive economic growth rates in these countries were concealing serious vulnerabilities. In particular, domestic credit had expanded rapidly for years, often poorly supervised, creating significant leverage along with loans extended to dubious projects. Rapidly rising real estate values (often fueled by easy access to credit) contributed to the problem, along with rising current account deficits and a buildup in external debt. Heavy foreign borrowing, often at short maturities, also exposed corporations and banks to significant exchange rate and funding risks—risks that had been masked by long-standing currency pegs. When the pegs fell apart, companies that owed money in foreign currencies suddenly owed a lot more in local currency terms, forcing many into insolvency.

Many Asian economies had also slid into current account deficits. If a country has a current account surplus, that means it is essentially a net lender to the rest of the world. If the current account balance is negative, then the country is a net borrower from the rest of the world. Current account deficits had grown on the back of heavy government spending (much of it directed to supporting continued export growth).

Response to the Asian Financial Crisis

The IMF intervened to stem the crisis with loans to stabilize the affected economies. The IMF and others lent roughly $118 billion in short-term loans to Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. The bailouts came with conditions, though: Governments had to raise taxes, cut spending, and eliminate many subsidies. By 1999, many of the affected countries began to show signs of recovery.

Other financial institutions also intervened. For example, in December 1997, the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank brokered a deal under which U.S. banks owed money by South Korean companies on short-term loans voluntarily agreed to roll them over into medium-term loans.

Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis

Many of the lessons of the Asian financial crisis remain relevant today. First, beware of asset bubbles, as they have a habit of bursting. Another is that governments need to control spending and pursue prudent economic development policies.

The Bottom Line

In 1997, decades of economic policy planning that featured close relationships among government policy planners, regulators, the industries they regulated, and financial institutions came to a head when markets began putting downward pressure on Asian currencies. The most vulnerable were those countries with high levels of debt and insufficient financing to pay it.

The IMF stepped in to bail out the most affected economies, but it imposed strict conditions in exchange for the help. Some measures included requiring governments to cut spending, raise taxes, eliminate subsidies, and restructure their financial systems.

The crisis also serves as a case study in asset bubbles and how quickly panic selling can trigger contagion that central bankers cannot control.

What Is Adverse Selection?

Adverse selection refers generally to a situation in which sellers have information that buyers do not have, or vice versa, about some aspect of product quality. In other words, it is a case where asymmetric information is exploited. Asymmetric information, also called information failure, happens when one party to a transaction has greater material knowledge than the other party.

Typically, the more knowledgeable party is the seller. Symmetric information is when both parties have equal knowledge.

In the case of insurance, adverse selection is the tendency of those in dangerous jobs or high-risk lifestyles to purchase products like life insurance. In these cases, it is the buyer who actually has more knowledge (i.e., about their health). To fight adverse selection, insurance companies reduce exposure to large claims by limiting coverage or raising premiums.

Understanding Adverse Selection

Adverse selection occurs when one party in a negotiation has relevant information the other party lacks. The asymmetry of information often leads to making bad decisions, such as doing more business with less profitable or riskier market segments.

In the case of insurance, avoiding adverse selection requires identifying groups of people more at risk than the general population and charging them more money. For example, life insurance companies go through underwriting when evaluating whether to give an applicant a policy and what premium to charge.

Underwriters typically evaluate an applicant’s height, weight, current health, medical history, family history, occupation, hobbies, driving record, and lifestyle risks such as smoking; all these issues impact an applicant’s health and the company’s potential for paying a claim. The insurance company then determines whether to give the applicant a policy and what premium to charge for taking on that risk.

Consequences of Adverse Selection

A seller may have better information than a buyer about products and services being offered, putting the buyer at a disadvantage in the transaction. For example, a company’s managers may more willingly issue shares when they know the share price is overvalued compared to the real value; buyers can end up buying overvalued shares and lose money. In the secondhand car market, a seller may know about a vehicle’s defect and charge the buyer more without disclosing the issue.

The general consequence of adverse selection is that it increases costs since consumers lack information held by sellers or producers, creating an asymmetry in the market. This can also lower consumption as buyers may be wary of the quality of the products that are offered for sale. Or, it may exclude certain consumers that do not have access to or cannot afford to obtain information that could lead them to make better buying decisions.

One indirect effect of this is a negative impact on consumers’ health and well-being. If you buy a faulty product or dangerous medication because you don’t have good information, consuming these products can cause physical harm. Or, by refraining from buying certain healthcare products (e.g., vaccines), consumers may wrongly judge a safe intervention as overly risky.

Adverse Selection in Insurance

Because of adverse selection, insurers find that high-risk people are more willing to take out and pay greater premiums for policies. If the company charges an average price but only high-risk consumers buy, the company takes a financial loss by paying out more benefits or claims.

However, by increasing premiums for high-risk policyholders, the company has more money with which to pay those benefits. For example, a life insurance company charges higher premiums for race car drivers. A car insurance company charges more for customers living in high-crime areas. A health insurance company charges higher premiums for customers who smoke. In contrast, customers who do not engage in risky behaviors are less likely to pay for insurance due to increasing policy costs.

A prime example of adverse selection in regard to life or health insurance coverage is a smoker who successfully manages to obtain insurance coverage as a nonsmoker. Smoking is a key identified risk factor for life insurance or health insurance, so a smoker must pay higher premiums to obtain the same coverage level as a nonsmoker. By concealing their behavioral choice to smoke, an applicant is leading the insurance company to make decisions on coverage or premium costs that are adverse to the insurance company’s management of financial risk.

Another example of adverse selection in the case of auto insurance would be a situation where the applicant obtains insurance coverage based on providing a residence address in an area with a very low crime rate when the applicant actually lives in an area with a very high crime rate. Obviously, the risk of the applicant’s vehicle being stolen, vandalized, or otherwise damaged when regularly parked in a high-crime area is substantially greater than if the vehicle was regularly parked in a low-crime area.

How to Minimize Adverse Selection

Adverse selection by increasing access to information, thus minimizing asymmetries. For consumers, the internet has greatly increased access while reducing costs. Crowdsourced information in the form of user reviews along with more formal reviews by bloggers or specialist websites are often free and warn potential buyers about otherwise obscure issues around quality.

Warranties and guarantees offered by sellers can also help, allowing consumers to use a product risk-free for a certain period to see if it has flaws or quality issues and the ability to return them without consequence if there are issues. Laws and regulations can also help, such as Lemon Laws in the used car industry. Federal regulatory authorities such as the FDA also help ensure that products are safe and effective for consumers.

Insurers reduce adverse selection by requesting medical information from applicants in the form of requiring paramedical examinations, querying doctors’ offices for medical records, and looking at one’s family history. This gives the insurance company more information that an applicant may fail to disclose on their own.

Moral Hazard vs. Adverse Selection

Like adverse selection, moral hazard occurs when there is asymmetric information between two parties, but where a change in the behavior of one party is exposed after a deal is struck. Adverse selection occurs when there’s a lack of symmetric information prior to a deal between a buyer and a seller.

Moral hazard is the risk that one party has not entered into the contract in good faith or has provided false details about its assets, liabilities, or credit capacity. For instance, in the investment banking sector, it may become known that government regulatory bodies will bail out failing banks; as a result, bank employees may take on excessive amounts of risk to score lucrative bonuses knowing that if their risky bets do not pan out, the bank will be saved anyhow.

The Lemons Problem

The lemons problem refers to issues that arise regarding the value of an investment or product due to asymmetric information possessed by the buyer and the seller.

The lemons problem was put forward in a research paper, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” written in the late 1960s by George A. Akerlof, an economist and professor at the University of California, Berkeley. The tag phrase identifying the problem came from the example of used cars Akerlof used to illustrate the concept of asymmetric information, as defective used cars are commonly referred to as lemons. The takeaway is that due to adverse selection, the only used cars left on the market will ultimately be lemons.

The lemons problem exists in the marketplace for both consumer and business products, and also in the arena of investing, related to the disparity in the perceived value of an investment between buyers and sellers. The lemons problem is also prevalent in financial sector areas, including insurance and credit markets. For example, in the realm of corporate finance, a lender has asymmetrical and less-than-ideal information regarding the actual creditworthiness of a borrower.

The Bottom Line

Contrary to assumptions made by mainstream economic and financial models, information is not symmetrically accessible and available to all actors in a market. In particular, sellers and producers often have far more information about what they are selling than do buyers. This information asymmetry can lead to market inefficiencies via what is known as adverse selection. In insurance markets, applicants have more information about themselves than do insurers, meaning that they withhold key information about being higher-risk.