Agency Bond: Definition, Types, and Tax Rules
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Agency Bond
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Agency Bond
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An agency problem is a conflict of interest inherent in any relationship where one party is expected to act in another’s best interests. In corporate finance, an agency problem usually refers to a conflict of interest between a company’s management and the company’s stockholders. The manager, acting as the agent for the shareholders, or principals, is supposed to make decisions that will maximize shareholder wealth even though it is in the manager’s best interest to maximize their own wealth.
The agency problem does not exist without a relationship between a principal and an agent. In this situation, the agent performs a task on behalf of the principal. Agents are commonly engaged by principals due to different skill levels, different employment positions, or restrictions on time and access. For example, a principal will hire a plumber—the agent—to fix plumbing issues. Although the plumber‘s best interest is to collect as much income as possible, they are given the responsibility to perform in whatever situation results in the most benefit to the principal.
The agency problem arises due to an issue with incentives and the presence of discretion in task completion. An agent may be motivated to act in a manner that is not favorable for the principal if the agent is presented with an incentive to act in this way. For example, in the plumbing example, the plumber may make three times as much money by recommending a service the agent does not need. An incentive (three times the pay) is present, causing the agency problem to arise.
Agency problems are common in fiduciary relationships, such as between trustees and beneficiaries; board members and shareholders; and lawyers and clients. A fiduciary is an agent that acts in the principal’s or client’s best interest. These relationships can be stringent in a legal sense, as is the case in the relationship between lawyers and their clients due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s assertion that an attorney must act in complete fairness, loyalty, and fidelity to their clients.
Agency costs are a type of internal cost that a principal may incur as a result of the agency problem. They include the costs of any inefficiencies that may arise from employing an agent to take on a task, along with the costs associated with managing the principal-agent relationship and resolving differing priorities. While it is not possible to eliminate the agency problem, principals can take steps to minimize the risk of agency costs.
Principal-agent relationships can be regulated, and often are, by contracts, or laws in the case of fiduciary settings. The Fiduciary Rule is an example of an attempt to regulate the arising agency problem in the relationship between financial advisors and their clients. The term fiduciary in the investment advisory world means that financial and retirement advisors are to act in the best interests of their clients. In other words, advisors are to put their clients’ interests above their own. The goal is to protect investors from advisors who are concealing any potential conflict of interest.
For example, an advisor might have several investment funds that are available to offer a client, but instead only offers the ones that pay the advisor a commission for the sale. The conflict of interest is an agency problem whereby the financial incentive offered by the investment fund prevents the advisor from working on behalf of the client’s best interest.
The agency problem may also be minimized by incentivizing an agent to act in better accordance with the principal’s best interests. For example, a manager can be motivated to act in the shareholders’ best interests through incentives such as performance-based compensation, direct influence by shareholders, the threat of firing, or the threat of takeovers.
Principals who are shareholders can also tie CEO compensation directly to stock price performance. If a CEO was worried that a potential takeover would result in being fired, the CEO might try to prevent the takeover, which would be an agency problem. However, if the CEO was compensated based on stock price performance, the CEO would be incentivized to complete the takeover. Stock prices of the target companies typically rise as a result of an acquisition. Through proper incentives, both the shareholders’ and the CEO’s interests would be aligned and benefit from the rise in stock price.
Principals can also alter the structure of an agent’s compensation. If, for example, an agent is paid not on an hourly basis but by the completion of a project, there is less incentive to not act in the principal’s best interest. In addition, performance feedback and independent evaluations hold the agent accountable for their decisions.
In 2001, energy giant Enron filed for bankruptcy. Accounting reports had been fabricated to make the company appear to have more money than what was actually earned. The company’s executives used fraudulent accounting methods to hide debt in Enron’s subsidiaries and overstate revenue. These falsifications allowed the company’s stock price to increase during a time when executives were selling portions of their stock holdings.
In the four years leading up to Enron’s bankruptcy filing, shareholders lost an estimated $74 billion in value. Enron became the largest U.S. bankruptcy at that time with its $63 billion in assets. Although Enron’s management had the responsibility to care for the shareholder’s best interests, the agency problem resulted in management acting in their own best interest.
Agency problems arise during a relationship between a principal and an agent. Agents are commonly engaged by principals due to different skill levels, different employment positions, or restrictions on time and access. The agency problem arises due to an issue with incentives and the presence of discretion in task completion. An agent may be motivated to act in a manner that is not favorable for the principal if the agent is presented with an incentive to act in this way.
In 2001, energy giant Enron filed for bankruptcy. Accounting reports had been fabricated to make the company appear to have more money than what was actually earned. These falsifications allowed the company’s stock price to increase during a time when executives were selling portions of their stock holdings. When Enron declared bankruptcy, it was the largest U.S. bankruptcy at that time. Although Enron’s management had the responsibility to care for the shareholder’s best interests, the agency problem resulted in management acting in their own best interest.
While it is not possible to eliminate the agency problem, principals can take steps to minimize the risk, known as agency cost, associated with it. Principal-agent relationships can be regulated, and often are, by contracts, or laws in the case of fiduciary settings. Another method is to incentivize an agent to act in better accordance with the principal’s best interests. For example, if an agent is paid not on an hourly basis but by the completion of a project, there is less incentive to not act in the principal’s best interest.
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An American depositary share (ADS) is an equity share of a non-U.S. company that is held by a U.S. depositary bank and is available for purchase by U.S. investors.
The entire issuance of shares by a foreign company is called an American Depositary Receipt (ADR), while the individual shares are referred to as ADSs. But the terms American Depositary Shares and American Depositary Receipts are often used interchangeably.
An ADR is a negotiable certificate issued by a U.S. bank, under agreement with the foreign company, and is evidence of ownership of ADSs, much the same way a stock certificate denotes ownership of equity shares.
ADSs are meant to facilitate trading of the shares. They can trade over-the-counter (OTC) or on a major exchange such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the Nasdaq (Nasdaq), depending on how much the foreign company is willing to comply with U.S. regulations. Listing on a major exchange generally requires the same level of reporting as that done by domestic companies, as well as adherence to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).
Foreign companies that choose to offer shares on U.S. exchanges gain the advantage of a wider investor base, which can also lower costs of future capital. For U.S. investors, ADSs offer the opportunity to invest in foreign companies without dealing with currency conversions and other cross-border administrative hoops.
There is some currency risk involved in holding ADSs. Fluctuations in the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the foreign currency will have some effect on the price of shares as well as on any income payments, which must be converted into U.S. dollars.
Tax treatment of dividends from ADSs is also different. Most countries apply a withholding amount on dividends issued for ADRs. This withholding amount can vary. For example, Chile and Switzerland withhold 35% while France can withhold as much as 75% of the tax on dividends, in the case of non-cooperative countries within the EU. The withholding tax is in addition to the dividend tax already levied by U.S. authorities. The dividend tax can be avoided by ADR investors by filling out Form 1116 for foreign tax credit.
A single ADS often represents more than one share of common stock. Further, ADSs can “gap” up or down outside of U.S. trading hours, when trading is happening in the company’s home country and U.S. markets are closed.
For example, South Korea’s Woori Bank, a subsidiary of Woori Financial Group, has ADSs that are traded in the U.S. The bank’s ADS gapped up by $0.03 on July 20, 2016. A technical analysis of the price action on this ADS shows that for the past decade, its price continued higher two-thirds of the time after a gap up.
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The 3(c)(7) exemption refers to a portion of the Investment Company Act of 1940 that allows private investment companies an exemption from some Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulation, providing that they meet certain criteria. 3C7 is shorthand for the 3(c)(7) exemption.
The exemption, found in section three of the act, reads in part:
Section 3
(3)(c) Notwithstanding subsection (a), none of the following persons is an investment company within the meaning of this title:
(7)(A) Any issuer, the outstanding securities of which are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers, and which is not making and does not at that time propose to make a public offering of such securities.
To qualify for the 3C7 exemption, the private investment company must show that they have no plans of making an initial public offering (IPO) and that their investors are qualified purchasers. A qualified purchaser is a higher standard than an accredited investor; it requires that the investor owns not less than $5 million in investments. The term “qualified purchaser” is defined in Section 2(a)(51) of the Investment Company Act.
3C7 funds are not required to go through Securities and Exchange Commission registration or provide ongoing disclosure. They are also exempt from issuing a prospectus that would outline investment positions publicly. 3C7 funds are also referred to as 3C7 companies or 3(c)(7) funds.
The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines an “investment company” as an issuer that “holds itself out as being engaged primarily or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading in securities.” 3C7 is one of two exemptions in the Investment Company Act of 1940 that hedge funds, venture capital funds, and other private equity funds use to avoid SEC restrictions.
This frees up these funds to use tools like leverage and derivatives to an extent that most publicly traded funds cannot. The vast majority of new hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds, and other private investment vehicles are organized so as to fall outside the purview of the Investment Company Act of 1940.
That said, 3C7 funds must maintain their compliance to continue utilizing this exemption from the 1940 Act. If a fund were to fall out of compliance by taking in investments from non-qualified purchasers, for example, it would open itself to SEC enforcement actions as well as litigation from its investors and any other parties it has contracts with.
Both 3C7 and 3C1 funds are exempted from the requirements imposed on “investment companies” under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “Act”). However, there are important differences between them. 3C7 funds, as noted, take investments from qualified purchasers, whereas 3C1 funds work with accredited investors.
Investors in 3C7 funds are held to a higher wealth measure than those in 3C1 funds, which can limit the investor pool that a fund is hoping to raise money from. That said, 3C1 funds are capped at 100 investors total, limiting the number of investors the fund can take in from the wider pool they are allowed to pull from.
3C7 funds don’t have a set cap. However, 3C7 funds will fall under the regulation that is stipulated in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 when they reach 2,000 investors. At this point, private funds are subject to increased SEC scrutiny and have more in common with public companies.
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