What Is the 2011 U.S. Debt Ceiling Crisis?

The 2011 U.S. Debt Ceiling Crisis was a contentious debate in Congress that occurred in July 2011 regarding the maximum amount of debt the federal government should be allowed.

Understanding the 2011 U.S. Debt Ceiling Crisis

The federal government has rarely achieved a balanced budget, and its budget deficit ballooned following the 2007-08 Financial Crisis. In the 2008 fiscal year, the deficit stood at $458.6 billon, widening to $1.4 trillion in 2009 as the government engaged in a massive fiscal policy response to the economic downturn.

Between 2008 and 2010, Congress raised the debt ceiling from $10.6 trillion to $14.3 trillion. In 2011, as the economy showed early signs of recovery and federal debt approached its limit once again, negotiations began in Congress to balance spending priorities against the ever-rising debt burden. 

Heated debate ensued, pitting proponents of spending and debt against fiscal conservatives. Pro-debt politicians argued that failing to raise the limit would require immediate cuts to spending already authorized by Congress, which could result in late, partial, or missed payments to Social Security and Medicare recipients, government employees, and government contractors.

Moreover, they asserted the Treasury could suspend interest payments on existing debt rather than withhold funds committed to federal programs. The prospect of cutting back on already promised spending was labeled a crisis by debt proponents.

On the other hand, the specter of a technical default on existing Treasury debt roiled financial markets. Fiscal conservatives argued that any debt limit increase should come with constraints on the growth of federal spending and debt accumulation.

Outcome of the 2011 U.S. Debt Ceiling Crisis

Congress resolved the debt ceiling crisis by passing the Budget Control Act of 2011, which became law on August 2, 2011. This act allowed the debt ceiling to be raised by $2.4 trillion in two phases, or installments.

In the first phase, a $400 billion increase would occur immediately, followed by another $500 billion unless Congress disapproved it. The second phase allowed for an increase between $1.2 trillion and $1.5 trillion, subject to Congressional disapproval as well. In return, the act included $900 billion in slowdowns in planned spending increases over a 10-year period. It also established a special committee charged with finding at least $1.5 trillion in additional savings.

In effect, the legislation incrementally raised the debt ceiling from $14.3 trillion to $16.4 trillion by January 27, 2012.

Following the passage of the act, Standard & Poor’s took the radical step of downgrading the United States long-term credit rating from AAA to AA+, even though the U.S. did not default. The report says, “The downgrade reflects our opinion that the fiscal consolidation plan that Congress and the Administration recently agreed to falls short of what, in our view, would be necessary to stabilize the government’s medium-term debt dynamics.” The credit rating agency cited the unimpressive size of deficit reduction plans relative to the likely future prospects for politically driven spending and debt accumulation.

Debt Approval Process Leading to the 2011 U.S. Debt Ceiling Crisis

The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to borrow money. Before 1917, this power was exercised by Congress authorizing the Treasury to borrow specified amounts of debt to fund limited expenses, such as war-time military spending, which would be repaid after the end of hostilities. This kept the national debt directly linked to authorized spending.

In 1917, Congress imposed a limit on federal debt as well as individual issuance limits. In 1939, Congress gave the Treasury more flexibility in how it managed the overall structure of federal debt, giving it an aggregate limit. However, by delegating debt management authority to the Treasury, Congress was able to break the direct connection between authorized spending and the debt that finances it. 

While allowing greater flexibility to raise spending, this practice also created a need for Congress to repeatedly raise the debt limit when spending threatens to overrun available credit. Due to occasional political resistance to the idea of continually expanding the federal debt, this process of raising the debt limit has at times engendered controversy, which occurred during the 2011 Debt Ceiling Crisis.

The Bottom Line

Following the 2007-08 Financial Crisis, in an effort to slow down the severe recession as well as the persistently high unemployment rate, the government increased federal spending. As a result, the federal debt reached its limit on multiple occasions from 2008 to 2011 which led to a series of increases of the debt limit. In 2011, the Treasury asked for its borrowing capacity to be extended.

The 2011 U.S. Debt Ceiling Crisis was a contentious debate in Congress that occurred in July 2011 regarding the maximum amount of debt the federal government should be allowed. Congress resolved the debt ceiling crisis by passing the Budget Control Act of 2011, which became law on August 2, 2011. This act allowed the debt ceiling to be raised by $2.4 trillion in two phases, or installments.

What Was the Asian Financial Crisis?

The Asian financial crisis, also called the “Asian Contagion,” was a sequence of currency devaluations and other events that began in July 1997 and spread across Asia. The crisis started in Thailand when the government ended the local currency’s de facto peg to the U.S. dollar after depleting much of the country’s foreign exchange reserves trying to defend it against months of speculative pressure.

Just weeks after Thailand stopped defending its currency, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia were also compelled to let their currencies fall as speculative market pressure built. By October, the crisis spread to South Korea, where a balance-of-payments crisis brought the government to the brink of default.

Other economies also came under pressure, but those with solid economic fundamentals and hefty foreign exchange reserves fared much better. Hong Kong fended off several major but unsuccessful speculative attacks on its currency, which is pegged to the U.S. dollar via a currency board system and backed by massive U.S. dollar reserves. 

Impact of the Asian Financial Crisis

As the Thai baht fell, other Asian currencies fell—some precipitously. Across Asia, inflows of capital slowed or reversed.

The Thai baht had been trading at about 26 to the U.S. dollar before the crisis but lost half its value by the end of 1997, falling to 53 to the dollar by January 1998. The South Korean won fell from about 900 to the dollar to 1,695 by the end of 1997. The Indonesian rupiah, which had been trading at around 2,400 to the dollar in June 1997, plummeted to 14,900 by June 1998, less than one-sixth its precrisis level.

Some of the more heavily affected countries fell into severe recession. Indonesia’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth fell from 4.7% in 1997 to -13.1% in 1998. In the Philippines, it slid from 5.2% to -0.5% over the same period. Malaysia’s GDP growth similarly slid from 7.3% in 1997 to -7.4% in 1998, while South Korea’s contracted from 6.2% to -5.1%.

In Indonesia, the ensuing economic crisis led to the collapse of the three-decade-old dictatorship of President Suharto.

The crisis was alleviated by intervention from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank, among others, which poured some $118 billion into Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea to bail out their economies.

As a result of the the crisis, affected countries restructured their economies, generally because the IMF required reform as a condition of help. The specific policy changes were different in each country but generally involved strengthening weak financial systems, lowering debt levels, raising interest rates to stabilize currencies, and cutting government spending.

The crisis also serves as a valuable case study for economists to understand how interwoven markets affect one another, especially as it relates to currency trading and national accounts management.

Causes of the Asian Financial Crisis

The crisis was rooted in several threads of industrial, financial, and monetary government policies and the investment trends that they created. Once the crisis began, markets reacted strongly, and one currency after another came under pressure. Some of the macroeconomic problems included current account deficits, high levels of foreign debt, climbing budget deficits, excessive bank lending, poor debt-service ratios, and imbalanced capital inflows and outflows.

Many of these problems were the result of policies to promote export-led economic growth in the years leading up to the crisis. Governments worked closely with manufacturers to support exports, including providing subsidies to favored businesses, more favorable financing, and a currency peg to the U.S. dollar to ensure an exchange rate favorable to exporters.

While this did support exports, it also created risk. Explicit and implicit government guarantees to bail out domestic industries and banks meant investors often did not assess the profitability of an investment but instead looked to its political support. Investment policies also created cozy relationships among local conglomerates, financial institutions, and the regulators who oversaw their industries. Large volumes of foreign money flowed in, often with little attention to potential risks. These factors all contributed to a massive moral hazard in Asian economies, encouraging major investment in marginal and potentially unsound projects.

As the crisis spread, it became clear that the impressive economic growth rates in these countries were concealing serious vulnerabilities. In particular, domestic credit had expanded rapidly for years, often poorly supervised, creating significant leverage along with loans extended to dubious projects. Rapidly rising real estate values (often fueled by easy access to credit) contributed to the problem, along with rising current account deficits and a buildup in external debt. Heavy foreign borrowing, often at short maturities, also exposed corporations and banks to significant exchange rate and funding risks—risks that had been masked by long-standing currency pegs. When the pegs fell apart, companies that owed money in foreign currencies suddenly owed a lot more in local currency terms, forcing many into insolvency.

Many Asian economies had also slid into current account deficits. If a country has a current account surplus, that means it is essentially a net lender to the rest of the world. If the current account balance is negative, then the country is a net borrower from the rest of the world. Current account deficits had grown on the back of heavy government spending (much of it directed to supporting continued export growth).

Response to the Asian Financial Crisis

The IMF intervened to stem the crisis with loans to stabilize the affected economies. The IMF and others lent roughly $118 billion in short-term loans to Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea. The bailouts came with conditions, though: Governments had to raise taxes, cut spending, and eliminate many subsidies. By 1999, many of the affected countries began to show signs of recovery.

Other financial institutions also intervened. For example, in December 1997, the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank brokered a deal under which U.S. banks owed money by South Korean companies on short-term loans voluntarily agreed to roll them over into medium-term loans.

Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis

Many of the lessons of the Asian financial crisis remain relevant today. First, beware of asset bubbles, as they have a habit of bursting. Another is that governments need to control spending and pursue prudent economic development policies.

The Bottom Line

In 1997, decades of economic policy planning that featured close relationships among government policy planners, regulators, the industries they regulated, and financial institutions came to a head when markets began putting downward pressure on Asian currencies. The most vulnerable were those countries with high levels of debt and insufficient financing to pay it.

The IMF stepped in to bail out the most affected economies, but it imposed strict conditions in exchange for the help. Some measures included requiring governments to cut spending, raise taxes, eliminate subsidies, and restructure their financial systems.

The crisis also serves as a case study in asset bubbles and how quickly panic selling can trigger contagion that central bankers cannot control.

What Is the Altman Z-Score?

The Altman Z-score is the output of a credit-strength test that gauges a publicly traded manufacturing company’s likelihood of bankruptcy.

Understanding the Altman Z-Score

The Altman Z-score, a variation of the traditional z-score in statistics, is based on five financial ratios that can be calculated from data found on a company’s annual 10-K report. It uses profitability, leverage, liquidity, solvency, and activity to predict whether a company has a high probability of becoming insolvent.

NYU Stern Finance Professor Edward Altman developed the Altman Z-score formula in 1967, and it was published in 1968. Over the years, Altman has continued to reevaluate his Z-score. From 1969 until 1975, Altman looked at 86 companies in distress, then 110 from 1976 to 1995, and finally 120 from 1996 to 1999, finding that the Z-score had an accuracy of between 82% and 94%.

In 2012, he released an updated version called the Altman Z-score Plus that one can use to evaluate public and private companies, manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies, and U.S. and non-U.S. companies. One can use Altman Z-score Plus to evaluate corporate credit risk. The Altman Z-score has become a reliable measure of calculating credit risk.

How to Calculate the Altman Z-Score

One can calculate the Altman Z-score as follows:

Altman Z-Score = 1.2A + 1.4B + 3.3C + 0.6D + 1.0E

Where:

• A = working capital / total assets
• B = retained earnings / total assets
• C = earnings before interest and tax / total assets
• D = market value of equity / total liabilities
• E = sales / total assets

A score below 1.8 means it’s likely the company is headed for bankruptcy, while companies with scores above 3 are not likely to go bankrupt. Investors can use Altman Z-scores to determine whether they should buy or sell a stock if they’re concerned about the company’s underlying financial strength. Investors may consider purchasing a stock if its Altman Z-Score value is closer to 3 and selling or shorting a stock if the value is closer to 1.8.

In more recent years, however, a Z-Score closer to 0 indicates a company may be in financial trouble. In a lecture given in 2019 titled “50 Years of the Altman Score,” Professor Altman himself noted that recent data has shown that 0—not 1.8—is the figure at which investors should worry about a company’s financial strength. The two-hour lecture is available to view for free on YouTube.

2008 Financial Crisis

In 2007, the credit ratings of specific asset-related securities had been rated higher than they should have been. The Altman Z-score indicated that the companies’ risks were increasing significantly and may have been heading for bankruptcy.

Altman calculated that the median Altman Z-score of companies in 2007 was 1.81. These companies’ credit ratings were equivalent to a B. This indicated that 50% of the firms should have had lower ratings, were highly distressed and had a high probability of becoming bankrupt.

Altman’s calculations led him to believe a crisis would occur and there would be a meltdown in the credit market. He believed the crisis would stem from corporate defaults, but the meltdown, which brought about the 2008 financial crisis, began with mortgage-backed securities (MBS). However, corporations soon defaulted in 2009 at the second-highest rate in history.