What Is Agency Theory?

Agency theory is a principle that is used to explain and resolve issues in the relationship between business principals and their agents. Most commonly, that relationship is the one between shareholders, as principals, and company executives, as agents.

Understanding Agency Theory

An agency, in broad terms, is any relationship between two parties in which one, the agent, represents the other, the principal, in day-to-day transactions. The principal or principals have hired the agent to perform a service on their behalf.

Principals delegate decision-making authority to agents. Because many decisions that affect the principal financially are made by the agent, differences of opinion, and even differences in priorities and interests, can arise. Agency theory assumes that the interests of a principal and an agent are not always in alignment. This is sometimes referred to as the principal-agent problem.

By definition, an agent is using the resources of a principal. The principal has entrusted money but has little or no day-to-day input. The agent is the decision-maker but is incurring little or no risk because any losses will be borne by the principal.

Financial planners and portfolio managers are agents on behalf of their principals and are given responsibility for the principals’ assets. A lessee may be in charge of protecting and safeguarding assets that do not belong to them. Even though the lessee is tasked with the job of taking care of the assets, the lessee has less interest in protecting the goods than the actual owners.

Areas of Dispute in Agency Theory

Agency theory addresses disputes that arise primarily in two key areas: A difference in goals or a difference in risk aversion.

For example, company executives, with an eye toward short-term profitability and elevated compensation, may desire to expand a business into new, high-risk markets. However, this could pose an unjustified risk to shareholders, who are most concerned with the long-term growth of earnings and share price appreciation.

Another central issue often addressed by agency theory involves incompatible levels of risk tolerance between a principal and an agent. For example, shareholders in a bank may object that management has set the bar too low on loan approvals, thus taking on too great a risk of defaults.

Reducing Agency Loss

Various proponents of agency theory have proposed ways to resolve disputes between agents and principals. This is termed “reducing agency loss.” Agency loss is the amount that the principal contends was lost due to the agent acting contrary to the principal’s interests.

Chief among these strategies is the offering of incentives to corporate managers to maximize the profits of their principals. The stock options awarded to company executives have their origin in agency theory. These incentives seek a way to optimize the relationship between principals and agents. Other practices include tying executive compensation in part to shareholder returns. These are examples of how agency theory is used in corporate governance.

These practices have led to concerns that management will endanger long-term company growth in order to boost short-term profits and their own pay. This can often be seen in budget planning, where management reduces estimates in annual budgets so that they are guaranteed to meet performance goals. These concerns have led to yet another compensation scheme in which executive pay is partially deferred and to be determined according to long-term goals.

These solutions have their parallels in other agency relationships. Performance-based compensation is one example. Another is requiring that a bond is posted to guarantee delivery of the desired result. And then there is the last resort, which is simply firing the agent.

What Is an Agency Problem?

An agency problem is a conflict of interest inherent in any relationship where one party is expected to act in another’s best interests. In corporate finance, an agency problem usually refers to a conflict of interest between a company’s management and the company’s stockholders. The manager, acting as the agent for the shareholders, or principals, is supposed to make decisions that will maximize shareholder wealth even though it is in the manager’s best interest to maximize their own wealth.

Understanding Agency Problems

The agency problem does not exist without a relationship between a principal and an agent. In this situation, the agent performs a task on behalf of the principal. Agents are commonly engaged by principals due to different skill levels, different employment positions, or restrictions on time and access. For example, a principal will hire a plumber—the agent—to fix plumbing issues. Although the plumber‘s best interest is to collect as much income as possible, they are given the responsibility to perform in whatever situation results in the most benefit to the principal.

The agency problem arises due to an issue with incentives and the presence of discretion in task completion. An agent may be motivated to act in a manner that is not favorable for the principal if the agent is presented with an incentive to act in this way. For example, in the plumbing example, the plumber may make three times as much money by recommending a service the agent does not need. An incentive (three times the pay) is present, causing the agency problem to arise.

Agency problems are common in fiduciary relationships, such as between trustees and beneficiaries; board members and shareholders; and lawyers and clients. A fiduciary is an agent that acts in the principal’s or client’s best interest. These relationships can be stringent in a legal sense, as is the case in the relationship between lawyers and their clients due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s assertion that an attorney must act in complete fairness, loyalty, and fidelity to their clients.

Minimizing Risks Associated With the Agency Problem

Agency costs are a type of internal cost that a principal may incur as a result of the agency problem. They include the costs of any inefficiencies that may arise from employing an agent to take on a task, along with the costs associated with managing the principal-agent relationship and resolving differing priorities. While it is not possible to eliminate the agency problem, principals can take steps to minimize the risk of agency costs.

Regulations

Principal-agent relationships can be regulated, and often are, by contracts, or laws in the case of fiduciary settings. The Fiduciary Rule is an example of an attempt to regulate the arising agency problem in the relationship between financial advisors and their clients. The term fiduciary in the investment advisory world means that financial and retirement advisors are to act in the best interests of their clients. In other words, advisors are to put their clients’ interests above their own. The goal is to protect investors from advisors who are concealing any potential conflict of interest.

For example, an advisor might have several investment funds that are available to offer a client, but instead only offers the ones that pay the advisor a commission for the sale. The conflict of interest is an agency problem whereby the financial incentive offered by the investment fund prevents the advisor from working on behalf of the client’s best interest.

Incentives

The agency problem may also be minimized by incentivizing an agent to act in better accordance with the principal’s best interests. For example, a manager can be motivated to act in the shareholders’ best interests through incentives such as performance-based compensation, direct influence by shareholders, the threat of firing, or the threat of takeovers.

Principals who are shareholders can also tie CEO compensation directly to stock price performance. If a CEO was worried that a potential takeover would result in being fired, the CEO might try to prevent the takeover, which would be an agency problem. However, if the CEO was compensated based on stock price performance, the CEO would be incentivized to complete the takeover. Stock prices of the target companies typically rise as a result of an acquisition. Through proper incentives, both the shareholders’ and the CEO’s interests would be aligned and benefit from the rise in stock price.

Principals can also alter the structure of an agent’s compensation. If, for example, an agent is paid not on an hourly basis but by the completion of a project, there is less incentive to not act in the principal’s best interest. In addition, performance feedback and independent evaluations hold the agent accountable for their decisions.

Real-World Example of an Agency Problem

In 2001, energy giant Enron filed for bankruptcy. Accounting reports had been fabricated to make the company appear to have more money than what was actually earned. The company’s executives used fraudulent accounting methods to hide debt in Enron’s subsidiaries and overstate revenue. These falsifications allowed the company’s stock price to increase during a time when executives were selling portions of their stock holdings.

In the four years leading up to Enron’s bankruptcy filing, shareholders lost an estimated $74 billion in value. Enron became the largest U.S. bankruptcy at that time with its $63 billion in assets. Although Enron’s management had the responsibility to care for the shareholder’s best interests, the agency problem resulted in management acting in their own best interest.

What Are Agency Costs?

An agency cost is a type of internal company expense, which comes from the actions of an agent acting on behalf of a principal. Agency costs typically arise in the wake of core inefficiencies, dissatisfactions, and disruptions, such as conflicts of interest between shareholders and management. The payment of the agency cost is to the acting agent.

Understanding Agency Cost

Agency costs can occur when the interests of the executive management of a corporation conflict with its shareholders. Shareholders may want management to run the company in a certain manner, which increases shareholder value.

Conversely, the management may look to grow the company in other ways, which may conceivably run counter to the shareholders’ best interests. As a result, the shareholders would experience agency costs.

As early as 1932, American economists Gardiner Coit Means and Adolf Augustus Berle discussed corporate governance in terms of an “agent” and a “principal,” in applying these principals towards the development of large corporations, where the interests of the directors and managers differed from those of owners.

Principal-Agent Relationship

The opposing party dynamic is called the principal-agent relationship, which primarily refers to the relationships between shareholders and management personnel. In this scenario, the shareholders are principals, and the management operatives act as agents.

However, the principal-agent relationship may also refer to other pairs of connected parties with similar power characteristics. For example, the relationship between politicians (the agents), and the voters (the principals) can result in agency costs. If the politicians promise to take certain legislative actions while running for election and once elected, don’t fulfill those promises, the voters experience agency costs. In an extension of the principal-agent dynamic known as the “multiple principal problems” describes a scenario where a person acts on behalf of a group of other individuals.

A Closer Look at Agency Costs

Agency costs include any fees associated with managing the needs of conflicting parties, in the process of evaluating and resolving disputes. This cost is also known as agency risk. Agency costs are necessary expenses within any organization where the principals do not yield complete autonomous power.

Due to their failure to operate in a way that benefits the agents working underneath them, it can ultimately negatively impact their profitability. These costs also refer to economic incentives such as performance bonuses, stock options, and other carrots, which would stimulate agents to execute their duties properly. The agent’s purpose is to help a company thrive, thereby aligning the interests of all stakeholders.

Dissatisfied Shareholders

Shareholders who disagree with the direction management takes, may be less inclined to hold on to the company’s stock over the long term. Also, if a specific action triggers enough shareholders to sell their shares, a mass sell-off could happen, resulting in a decline in the stock price. As a result, companies have a financial interest in benefitting shareholders and improving the company’s financial position, as failing to do so could result in stock prices dropping.

Additionally, a significant purge of shares could potentially spook potential new investors from taking positions, thus causing a chain reaction, which could depress stock prices even further.

In cases where the shareholders become particularly distressed with the actions of a company’s top brass, an attempt to elect different members to the board of directors may occur. The ouster of the existing management can happen if shareholders vote to appoint new members to the board. Not only can this jarring action result in significant financial costs, but it can also result in the expenditure of time and mental resources.

Such upheavals also cause unpleasant and exorbitant red-tape problems, inherent in top-chain recalibration of power.

Real-World Example of Agency Costs

Some of the most notorious examples of agency risks come during financial scandals, such as the Enron debacle in 2001. As reported in this article on SmallBusiness.chron.com, the company’s board of directors and senior officers sold off their stock shares at higher prices, due to fraudulent accounting information, which artificially inflated the stock’s value. As a result, shareholders lost significant money, when Enron share price consequently nosedived.

Broken down to its simplest terms, according to the Journal of Accountancy, the Enron debacle happened because of “individual and collective greed born in an atmosphere of market euphoria and corporate arrogance.”